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Spinning Gold: The Financial Returns to External Stakeholder Engagement

ABSTRACT
We provide direct empirical evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory‘s
argument that increasing cooperation and reducing conflict with stakeholders enhances the
financial valuation of a firm holding constant the objective valuation of the physical assets
under its control. We undertake this analysis using panel data on 26 gold mines owned by 19
publicly traded firms over the period 1993-2008. We code over 50,000 stakeholder events
from media reports to develop an index of the degree of stakeholder cooperation or conflict
for these mines. By incorporating this index in a market capitalization analysis, we reduce the
discount placed by financial markets on the net present value of the gold controlled by these
firms from 72 to between 33 and 12 percent.
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Introduction
In response to the growing societal challenge to multinational corporations‘ strategic
pursuit of short-term economic returns, these organizations increasingly seek to buttress the
political and social support for their operations. The empirical literature examining the
returns to such investments is, however, highly equivocal and provides limited evidence of at
best a marginal and contingent positive relationship between these efforts and financial
performance. Theoretical explanations for the imbalance between rhetoric in support of such
activities and their limited financial impact focus on either managers‘ incentives to extract
rents from the economic value chain or shareholders or the particular set of circumstances
required for redistribution of existing rents among members of the economic value chain to
enhance financial performance. We highlight another theoretical argument consistent with the
original tenets of instrumental stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995, Donaldson & Preston,
1995, Jones, 1995). We argue that efforts to win the cooperation of and reduce the conflict
with external stakeholders, rather than merely altering the distribution of rents among direct
factors of production, can be conceived of as investments in political and social capital. Such
investments reduce opportunistic hold-up by a broad range of political and social actors
thereby enhancing the probability that a business plan can proceed on schedule and on budget
and, ultimately, generate sustainable shareholder value.
Our empirical analysis is set in the gold mining sector where strong stakeholder
conflict resulting from the social and environmental consequences of mining and its
association with corruption and private rent seeking has led to costly delays and disruptions
in project development and execution. The resulting cost overruns or revenue shortfalls have
triggered substantial corrective investment in stakeholder engagement strategies by many
mining companies. Ironically, the very companies that were once pilloried for their lack of
concern for anything but the short-term financial bottom line are now global leaders in the
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implementation of stakeholder engagement. Their growing preference for operating mines
under conditions of political and social support are also affecting small mining companies,
who, motivated by their desire to eventually sell their operations to the majors, are
increasingly acknowledging the need to obtain a ―social license‖ for their mining projects
around the world. This sentiment was expressed to us in the following quote from the Chief
Operating Officer of one of the mines in our sample.
It used to be the case that the value of a gold mine was based on three variables: the
amount of gold in the ground, the cost of extraction, and the world price of gold.
Today, I can show you two mines identical on these three variables that differ in their
valuation by an order of magnitude. Why? Because one has local support and the
other doesn‘t.‖ (Yani Roditis, COO Gabriel Resources, interview by authors)
Our empirical design follows directly from this observation in linking information on
financial market valuation to the intrinsic value of the gold mine and demonstrating that the
degree of stakeholder cooperation and conflict helps to explain the gap or difference between
these figures. We undertake this analysis using panel data on 26 gold mines over the period
1993-2008.
We manually code over 50,000 stakeholder events from the population of media
reports covering these mines. Our sentence-level coding protocol identifies the population of
media relevant stakeholders initiating an action or expressing a sentiment as well as the target
of that action or statement. It codes the action or expression according to a well-developed
scale in the conflict studies literature that quantifies the degree of cooperation or conflict
among political and social actors. We explore various means to aggregate this time varying
network of stakeholder cooperation and conflict into a single time varying metric of political
and social support for the mine. We demonstrate that these metrics are an important
component, together with characteristics of the mine and the price of gold, in calculating the
financial market valuation of the 19 publicly traded parent firms. Specifically, by
incorporating this metric in a market capitalization analysis that also includes macro-political
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level constraints on policy change, we reduce the discount placed by financial markets on the
net present value of the gold controlled by these firms from 72 to between 33 and 12 percent.
We first summarize the theoretical literature highlighting the various causal
mechanisms that authors have argued influence the relationship between stakeholder conflict
and cooperation and financial market valuation. We highlight the lack of direct empirical
evidence for the core argument of one mechanism in instrumental stakeholder theory: a
positive relationship between cooperation with a broad set of stakeholders and corporate
financial performance contingent upon objective asset valuation. Next we describe the
empirical context in which we find empirical support for this relationship including anecdotal
and qualitative evidence supporting our hypothesis as well as the specific data we amass for
the purpose of this test.
We close by discussing the contribution of this analysis to the literatures on
instrumental stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility as well as multinational
strategy. We also argue for the generalizability of the analysis beyond gold mining and
natural resource extraction more broadly to a wide array of multinational activity. We
highlight, in particular, the myriad benefits offered by deploying project-level event data as
reported in the media in this context and in many other elements of management research.
This discussion reveals next steps in a broader research agenda designed to enhance the
theoretical and empirical support for the implementation of stakeholder engagement.
An Extended Formulation of Instrumental Stakeholder Theory
Multiple theoretical models explore the mechanisms by which managerial efforts to
enhance cooperation and reduce conflict with stakeholders could positively or negatively
impact financial performance. One set of models highlight that, given imperfect corporate
governance, managers may seek to enhance cooperation and reduce conflict with
stakeholders in order to improve their quality of life, their reputation or their status even if it
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is not profitable for shareholders. They predict a negative relationship between efforts at
enhancing stakeholder cooperation and reducing conflict and financial performance. A
second group of models identify a set of market conditions and contingencies whereby
managerial decisions to alter the nature of the production process or product increase
consumers‘ willingness to pay and/or reduce suppliers‘ reservation price. Together these
models suggest a distribution of potential relationships and contingencies with a growing
body of empirical literature corroborating this prediction. A final group of models incorporate
strategic activists. These models are as of yet largely indeterminate in their predictions
regarding the sign of the relationship and its magnitude, with variance explained by
characteristics of the activists and the strategic response of firms. The attention and
commitment to stakeholder engagement by senior managers suggest that these theoretical
extensions to incorporate a broader set of stakeholders in the basic model focusing on the
economic value chain are warranted. However, we lack both clear empirical evidence
regarding the magnitude of the potential returns available through such efforts and data to test
the contingencies that are beginning to emerge from this theory. We seek to provide both.
Scholars skeptical of efforts to engage stakeholders or seeking to explain negative
empirical associations between such efforts and shareholder value have argued that managers
use relationships with external stakeholders to pursue self-interest seeking perquisites, career
enhancement or moral peace of mind. Levitt (1958) and Friedman (1962, 1970) famously
attack efforts by managers to pursue objectives other than shareholder value maximization as
short-term conflict avoidance by managers. They advocate instead a single-minded all-out
focus on profit maximization (see Sundaram and Inkpen, (2004) for a literature review of the
shareholder value debate). Jensen (2002) models shareholder principals‘ loss of control over
managerial agents who may seek to pursue personal social interests (Hemingway &
Maclagan, 2004) by in the presence of multiple hard-to-quantify performance metrics.
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Authors have also highlighted the possibility of collusion between managers and either
institutional shareholders (Cespa & Cestone, 2007) or non-shareholding stakeholders
(Surroca & Tribó, 2008) in support of managerial tenure and social responsibility at the
expense of (non-institutional) shareholder returns. Institutional theorists have highlighted the
pressures for managerial conformity that can arise from regulation, peer behavior and civil
society independent of the efficiency of adoption (Campbell, 2007, Jennings & Zandbergen,
1995, Margolis & Walsh, 2003, Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007).
Empirical research supporting these mechanisms include studies showing that
financial slack is a determinant of corporate social performance (McGuire, Alison, &
Schneeweis, 1988, Waddock & Graves, 1997); headquarter policies rather than local
conditions drive social responsibility programs in foreign subsidiaries (Husted & Allen,
2006); shareholder activism reallocates discretionary resources away from corporate social
performance (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007); and insider ownership and leverage (i.e.,
factors that increase managerial alignment with shareholder interests) are negatively
associated with corporate social responsibility (Barnea & Rubin, 2006). Baron, Harjoto & Jo
(2009) find that social pressure diverts resources away from corporate financial performance
towards corporate social performance, social performance has no net effect on financial
performance (though further analysis shows that the result is positive in consumer goods and
negative in industrial industries) and that social pressure is directed at soft targets.
Scholars supportive of efforts to engage stakeholders or seeking to explain a positive
empirical relationship between such efforts and shareholder value shift the focus of the
theoretical argument from the costs of ex post managerial discretion to external stakeholders‘
influence over ex ante managerial strategy with respect to members of the value chain (see
Laplume Sonpar and Litz, (2008) or Kitzmueller & Shimshack (2011) for a literature
review). This literature seeks to formalize elements of Freeman‘s (2010, 1984) stakeholder
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approach to strategic management which emphasizes how the preferences and objectives of
the myriad actors with a political, economic or social stake in the operations should be
incorporated within strategy-making. Hill & Jones (1992) emphasize the potential for
stakeholder engagement to reduce the transaction costs of exchange and monitoring between
interdependent counterparties. Freeman & Evan (1993, 1990) and Phillips (1997) claim that
―fairness‖ in stakeholder relations in a Rawlsian sense minimizes these transaction costs
thereby maximizing shareholder value. Logsdon & Wood (2002, 2002, 2001), Matten &
Crane (2005) and Gardberg & Fombrun (2006), by contrast, emphasize the obligations and
responsibilities of citizenship that stakeholders implicitly impose on corporations as a means
of determining appropriate activities. Mackey, Mackey & Barney (2007) incorporate the
supply and demand for corporate social responsibility activities into a contemporaneous
model of corporate valuation. Several formal accounts of this logic analyze the competition
for charitable contributions from stakeholders between publicly traded companies and notfor-profit entities and consider the implications for consumer welfare, the level of public
regulation and the relationship between corporate social performance and financial
performance (Besley & Ghatak, 2007, Kotchen, 2006, Navarro, 1988, Zivin & Small, 2005).
If combined with differentiated marketing or regulations that place followers at a
disadvantage, such activity could itself generate economic rents. The financial benefits to
such activities need not accrue contemporaneously. One line of theoretical (Godfrey, 2005)
and empirical (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009) work posits and demonstrates that
corporate social responsibility can contribute to moral or reputational capital that insulates the
firm from negative consequences in the event of future adverse shocks.
While extremely useful in leading to a broadening of the scope of inquiry beyond ex
post rent distribution, stakeholder theory has struggled with the development of direct
empirical tests of these mechanisms. Recent work strives, instead, to create better typologies
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for the identification and prioritization of stakeholders (Barnett, 2007, Bourne & Walker,
2005, Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), their psychological and social motivations (Aguilera,
Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007, Rupp, Williams, & Aguilera, 2011), their influence
tactics (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008a, 2008b, Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007, den Hond, de
Bakker, & de Haan, 2010, Frooman, 1999), the resulting optimal form of engagement for
multinational corporations with those stakeholders (Greenwood, 2007, van Huijstee &
Glasbergen, 2008) and the cross-national differences therein (Matten & Moon, 2008,
Williams & Aguilera, 2008). Nevertheless, the link between identification, engagement and,
especially, asset valuation or corporate performance remains elusive. One exception is in the
area of environmental compliance where scholars find positive financial returns to
investments in pollution reduction (Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000, King & Lenox, 2001) and
highlight the financial impact of environmental pressure groups (Binder & Neumayer, 2005,
Epstein & Schnietz, 2002, Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000).
By contrast, a growing body of literature in organizational economics highlights the
impact of (stakeholder perceptions of) corporate social responsibility on the supply or price
of factors of production (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and the extent of shared value creation
(Porter & Kramer, 2011). Moral motivations may alter the behavior of numerous stakeholders
(Brekke, Kverndokk, & Nyborg, 2003),including consumers who may be willing to pay more
for a product or service perceived as socially responsible (Arora & Gangopadhyay, 1995,
Casadesus Masanell, Crooke, Reinhardt, & Vasishth, 2009, Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus,
2009, Elfenbein & McManus, 2010, Hiscox & Smyth, 2011). As a result, where signaling of
producer type is more important or effective (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) or where such
consumers are more powerful (Hoepner, Yu, & Ferguson, 2010) or markets vary in their
competitiveness (Bagnoli & Watts, 2003, Fisman, Heal, & Nair, 2005, Fisman, Heal, & Nair,
2006), companies should exhibit greater corporate social responsibility. Employees may
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prefer to work for a company they perceive to be socially responsible, demand lower wages
or benefits or exert greater effort (Besley & Ghatak, 2005, Bhattacharya, Sen, & Korschun,
2008, Brekke & Nyborg, 2008, Collier & Esteban, 2007, Greening & Turban, 2000, Kim,
Lee, Lee, & Kim, 2010, Preston, 1989, Turban & Greening, 1997). Suppliers of other factors
of production could make similar choices influencing the cost of capital or production
(Bruyn, 1991, Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2011, Porter & Kramer, 2006a, Sparkes &
Cowton, 2004, Waddock, 2000).
Activists themselves can be considered a stakeholder whose preferences, strategies or
resources can influence corporate behavior (Baron, 2009, 2001, Baron & Diermeier, 2007,
Frooman, 1999, Hendry, 2006, Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004, Rowley & Berman,
2000, Spar & La Mure, 2003). Efforts at generating such advantages with key stakeholders
can generate sustained rents if corporate governance is strong (Shahzad, David, & Sharfman,
2011), customer switching is costly due to the development of relation-based trust (Du,
Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007, Lacey, 2007, Mohr & Webb, 2005, Salmones, Crespo, &
Bosque, 2005, Vlachos, Tsamakos, Vrechopoulos, & Avramidis, 2009) or regulation
emanating from governments (after lobbying) or industry leaders (Frynas, 2010, Frynas,
2008, Michael, 2003) allows first movers to monetize their advantage. The choice as to
whether to engage or confront stakeholders is itself a complex function of competitor
strategies and stakeholders‘ choices between engagement and confrontation (Baron, 2011;
Diermeier, Abito & Besanko, 2011).
While these extensions of agency models of managerial discretion highlight
circumstances under which the returns to stakeholder engagement may be positive, it must be
noted that the circumstances are relatively specific. One interpretation of the equivocal
empirical findings regarding the sign and magnitude of the relationship lies in these
contingencies. Such findings highlight that while stakeholder engagement may pay for
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shareholders of a subset of firms, it is costly for others, and seem to suggest that on balance,
the rhetoric surrounding stakeholder engagement is oversold. We disagree.
The emphasis within these formal models and the supporting empirical analysis on
stakeholders who form a part of the economic value chain as defined by the producer and
whose main choice is the price charged for inputs or willingness to pay for outputs runs
counter to the broader precepts of a stakeholder approach. The addition of homogenous
activists able to increase production costs or reduce consumer willingness to pay is a
welcome extension, but we argue for an even broader conceptualization of relevant
stakeholders and offer an alternative empirical approach to demonstrating the financial
impact of broad stakeholder engagement.
For many production processes, an implicit or explicit social license to operate is a
necessary if difficult to specify input. For example, fifteen billion dollars of gold sitting in a
mountainside cannot be transformed into shareholder rents with financial, engineering and
marketing inputs alone. It also requires the political and social support of key stakeholders
including not only members of the economic value chain but also government officials,
regulators, community leaders and members of civil society (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). These
stakeholders may reside locally, nationally or internationally. As their degree of conflict with
the owner and operator of the proposed gold mine increases, they are able to either extract
rents for their preferred causes from the efficient operation of the mine or coordinate public
and private activity (e.g., in the government, among unions or activists) to delay the opening
of the mine, suspend its operations or so raise the cost of continued development or
operations as to make the mine owner and operator choose to suspend or abandon it. Efforts
to build community support are made not to increase consumer willingness to pay for the
gold nor to extract rents from suppliers but rather in order to maintain the right formally and
directly granted by the government but informally and indirectly granted by a broader set of
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external stakeholders to transform the gold and generate rents from that process (Aden, KyuHong, & Rock, 1999, Dasgupta, Laplante, & Mamingi, 2001, Liu, 2009). In this formulation,
activities perceived by stakeholders as socially responsible build up political and social
capital that enhances stakeholder cooperation and reduces stakeholder conflict. As a result,
the probability that a business plan can proceed on schedule and on budget is enhanced and
the financial market discount applied to the objective (i.e., free of stakeholder influence)
valuation of the tangible assets is reduced. The resulting empirical prediction is that we
should observe that stakeholder cooperation positively and stakeholder conflict negatively
impact the market valuation of a firm, holding constant the objective value of firm assets.
Empirical Analysis
We conduct our empirical analysis of this hypothesis in the gold mining industry due
to the unique availability of data that allows for the identification of the financial impact of
stakeholder relations and due to the widespread acknowledgement of the critical role of such
relations for profitability even in the absence of the causal mechanisms considered in the
recent extant literature. A recent report by Control Risks Group examines the importance of
above surface (i.e., political and social) risks highlights that given the declining reserves in
industrialized democracies and the rising mean price and volatility in price, increased
political and social conflict over the distribution of rents during boom years and losses during
lean years is inevitable. The report concludes that ―The successful 21st century mining
company will have to become a master at managing political risk. It will make sophisticated,
informed and rational decisions about political risk and will manage the implementation of
value-creating risk management programmes. It will not be afraid to pursue opportunities in
most parts of the world. As a consequence, it will create substantial and enduring value for its
shareholders (Control Risks Group, 2006).‖
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Note that in the case of mining companies, there is little evidence that the channels by
which the organizational economics literature posits this relationship to exist are operative.
Consumers are unable to differentiate between gold from one mine or company or another.
There is little evidence that miners or managers of mining companies are defecting or
offering wage or productivity benefits to more responsible mining companies. An insufficient
number of investors are allocating capital on socially responsible grounds to influence
managerial behavior. Activists, though prominent, are unable to impose substantial direct
costs on mining companies. By contrast, mining is an industry where the valuation of a fixed
resource (i.e., a gold mine), could vary wildly based on the degree of stakeholder cooperation
or conflict so the indirect costs that activists and other stakeholders could impose may be
substantial. Stakeholder relations can influence the regulatory environment, land permitting,
environmental regulation, taxation, labor contracts, terms of capital intensive imports and the
like. The value of a fixed stock of gold is thus plausibly linked to these stakeholders‘
preferences on whether the owner should have the right to transform the underground gold
into shareholder capital.
Our specific empirical context is the population of 19 publicly traded mining firms on
the Toronto Stock Exchange who own and operate one, two or three mines outside of the
United States, Canada and Australia as listed in the Raw Materials Database1—a total of 26
mines in 20 countries that have reached the stage of a feasibility study.2 We have gathered all
relevant financial and operating data on these companies during the period that they were
publicly listed after the completion of their feasibility studies. This sampling criterion allows
us to draw upon strict Canadian disclosure requirements3 for financial and operating data of
mining firms, in order to obtain sufficient information to estimate the intrinsic value of the
1

Raw Materials Database – http://www.rmg.se.
A feasibility study is an economic study based on sample drilling results and engineering analysis, which presents enough
information to determine whether or not the project should be advanced to the construction and production stage. These
estimates are intended to be accurate within a 15 percent error band.
3
http://www.tsx.com/en/listings/tsx_issuer_resources/continuous_disclosure.html
2
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mines using widely accepted resource valuation models; and exploit the clear and direct links
between media reports on a single (or two or three) mine(s) and changes in financial
performance without contamination from numerous other news stories covering other assets
or practices of the same publicly traded company.
For these mines we combine financial and operating data from the parent company‘s
quarterly financial reports filed with SEDAR filling system4 and the stock price information
from the Toronto Stock Exchange. These data allow us to measure the current market
valuation of the firms, the intrinsic valuation of their gold reserves and their degree of
stakeholder cooperation or conflict as detailed below.
Financial Market Valuation. We use a simple financial valuation formula that models
stock market value as a function of the value of a company‘s announced resource stock and
the likelihood that the company will successfully extract these resources without extensive
planning or operational delays. Formally, we estimate
∑
, where
refers to the market value of company i at time t
reflects the current valuation of mine j of company i at time t,
is the number of mines owned and operated by company i, where i =1, 2 or 3, and
is the probability at time t that company i will advance the exploitation of the
resources at mine j according to the announced schedule.
We calculate the market value of company i at time t (

by multiplying the stock price

times the number of common shares outstanding and adding company debt. Stock price data
was obtained directly from the Toronto Stock Exchange. Shares outstanding and debt
information are taken from the COMPUSTAT North America database.
Our analysis aims to show the extent to which fluctuations in the financial values of
the companies in our sample can be explained by the value of the gold in the ground or needs
to be broadened to incorporate non-market factors that might affect the timely extraction of

4

The SEDAR filing system provides access to most public securities documents and information filed by public companies
and investment funds with the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).
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the resources and that signal to investors that they should discount the value they ascribe to
the gold still in the ground. We discuss below the evaluation of the resource value (
the measurement of two factors affecting the exploitation of the resource (

) and

): the level of

stakeholder cooperation or conflict and country-level political risk.
Resource Valuation. We build upon a baseline resource valuation model developed by
Cairns and Davis (1998), who propose a modified formulation of the Hotelling valuation
principle for valuing hard-rock mineral properties (Miller & Upton, 1985a, 1985b) that relies
on assumptions used by mining engineers when planning the rate of extraction for a mine. 5
We apply Cairns‘ and Davis‘ model to our empirical context by adding a time
dimension and considering the possibility that companies in our sample own multiple mines
for which the resource value can be assessed separately. Formally, we evaluate each mine j of
company i as follows
(

(

)

)

, where

= average forecast operating profit per unit of gold of mine j and time t,
= quantity of gold reserves of gold mine j at time t,
= quarters of estimated mine life for gold mine j at time t,6
= quarters of operation of gold mine j at time t,
= Treasury bond yield with term
at time t.
We compute the average forecast operating profit per unit of gold for mine j of company i at
time t as

(

)

∑

(

), or the average

quarterly profit for the remaining period of operation. Following Cairns and Davis (1998), we
use the current price of gold to estimate forecast profits. For each mine, data on the cost of
extraction (

), the remaining quantity of proven and probable gold

5

The model retains the central parameters of the Hotelling valuation principle (commodity price, cost of
production, and mineral reserve data) but allows for the use of average cost data which is more readily available
for different mines.
6
T denotes total estimated mine life, not the remaining mine life at time t. T is indexed by t because companies
often adjust their estimates of the total life of a mine to reflect adjustments in reserve estimates, or changes in
technology or production schedules.
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reserves

, the estimated mine life

, and the production start date used to calculate the

quarters the mine has already been in operation

were collected from company annual and

quarterly reports, annual information forms, technical reports and press releases available on
the companies‘ websites or filed with SEDAR. For the Treasury-bond yield

we use

Treasury constant-maturity data provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
available for different terms from 1 month to 30 years.
We posit that investors discount heavily the resource value when they anticipate that
the probability that the company will successfully develop its mining reserves according to
the announced schedule is low. The value of hundreds of ounces of gold reserves to the
company‘s shareholders is zero if the mining company has its license to exploit revoked or if
it cannot get approval to begin the construction of the mine. On the basis of this intuition, we
discount the resource value by the probability that the resource will be exploited without
significant planning and operational delays and model this probability: (1) as a function of
project-level risks determined by the level of conflict or cooperation between the company
and various stakeholders affected or interested in the development of the gold mining project,
and (2) as a function of country-level policy uncertainty. We describe the operationalization
of the stakeholder conflict-cooperation and of country-level policy uncertainty in the
following sections.
Stakeholder Conflict-Cooperation. Our research advances the study of the financial
impact of stakeholder engagement through the development of media-based stakeholder
event data that captures the level of cooperation or conflict between the company and its
various political, social and economic stakeholders. Throughout the nearly four-decade long
history of empirical literature on the link between stakeholder relations and corporate
financial performance (see Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh (2007) and Orlitzky, Schmidt &
Rynes (2003)), measurement of the former construct has proven a daunting challenge. Early
15

studies relied on small-sample comparisons of subjectively rated ―better‖ vs. ―worse‖
performers or used corporate responses to surveys. Over time, external sources of data
replaced researchers‘ own ratings and the data became more objective relying upon consumer
polling and analysis of annual reports and other public documents regarding corporate
practices. While these external and more objective data sources were a clear improvement
over their predecessors both in assuaging concerns on construct validity and in expanding the
sample of covered firms, their unit of analysis remained the corporation. Scholars thus
explored the link between corporate-level disclosures, audits and policies and performance,
but struggled with converting these results into operational guidance to front line managers
tasked with resource allocation decisions. Doing so required untenable assumptions that
corporate policies translated into operational practices for stakeholder relations and that
strategies were not contingent upon country, stakeholder, issue, time, industry and project
context. Scholars seeking to loosen these assumptions struggled with a lack of more fine
grained data.
By contrast, scholars seeking to highlight the costs to corporations of irresponsible
activity or of being targeted by activists, have long used more micro-level event data drawn
from media reports (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004). A wide body of literature links
media reporting of adverse events including product recalls (Davidson & Worrell, 1992),
corporate criminal activity (Davidson & Worrell, 1988, Gunthorpe, 1997, Karpoff, Lee, &
Vendrzyk, 1999, Karpoff & Lott Jr, 1993, Reichert, Lockett, & Rao, 1996), violations of
labor law (Davidson, Worrell, & Cheng, 1994, Hersch, 1991) and environmental violations
(Karpoff, Lott Jr, & Wehrly, 2005) to negative financial performance. More recently and
closely related to our analysis, King & Soule (2007) demonstrate that activist campaigns in
the media negatively impact market valuation particularly for campaigns targeting consumers
or workers in firms who themselves lack a strong prior record of media coverage (i.e., a stock
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of reputational capital). These studies typically proceed by linking information on the date of
an adverse event to abnormal stock market returns or a long-term reduction in market
valuation. King & Soule (2007) go further in coding information on the size of the protest,
the number of sponsoring organizations and the type of issue.
Scholars in international relations and conflict studies have gone even further in their
coding of event data in their long-standing examination of the impact of ‗soft power‘ or the
degree of conflict and cooperation among states on subsequent relations between those states
including the incidence of military conflict (for a review of this literature see Schrodt (1993)).
In this literature, events are coded as subject-verb-object triples in which one actor undertakes
an action or expresses an opinion connoting conflict or cooperation with another actor. The
intertemporal evolution of dyadic and network conflict and cooperation is analyzed to
ascertain the determinants of escalation of international conflict or cooperation.
The closest analogue to this type of data in the management realm lies in the realm of
corporate reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) where the appearance of negative words in
the media is associated with subsequent deterioration in earnings and stock prices (Tetlock,
Saar-Tsechansky, & Macskassy, 2008) as well as overall stock index levels, trading volume
and volatility (Das & Chen, 2007, Loughran & McDonald, 2010, Remus, Heyer, & Ahmad,
2009). The tone of earnings press releases is associated with subsequent earnings and short
term stock price movement (Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2007). Text analysis of Amazon seller
reviews similarly demonstrates that strong reputations are associated with increasing market
power (Ghose & Ipeirotis, 2008).
Following such an event-based approach to testing instrumental stakeholder theory
offers numerous advantages over the extant approaches of relying on corporate disclosures,
audits or principles. First, a much larger sample of firms could potentially be incorporated
within an analysis. Second, the perceptual or stakeholder opinions that are included within
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the media reports are more likely to be those who have direct association with the firm as
opposed to more distant topical experts. Third, real time event reports in the media offer a
much more accurate source of information on how a company is perceived by its stakeholders
at a moment in time than do periodic audits or expert surveys. As stakeholder cooperation
and conflict fluctuates with events and tactics, a measure which captures these dynamics
should outperform those that are more static. Finally, it is easier to separate and, in particular,
examine the interdependence of stakeholder actions and opinions and those of the focal firm.
We create a novel stakeholder events database comprising events linking firms and
their stakeholders from the full set of media documents in the FACTIVA database that
mention the mine or the parent company of the mine. For each mine, every article is read and
all stakeholder events are hand-coded according to a detailed coding protocol adapted from
the international conflict studies literature (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003, King &
Lowe, 2003).
First, a stakeholder event is an instance in which a media-relevant7 stakeholder acts or
expresses sentiment towards the firm or vice-versa. Events may be cooperative or conflictual
and vary in their strength along these two dimensions. We distinguish between the initiator of
the event and the target of the relation by coding which source actor did what to which target
actor, i.e., concisely captured by the phrase: who (SOURCE actor) did what (VERB or VERB
PHRASE) to whom (TARGET ACTOR)? This unique stakeholder event database includes
over 50,000 hand-coded stakeholder events of which approximately half include the investing
firm and are therefore included with our empirical analysis.
Second, the degree of conflict or cooperation is coded using a modified version of the
Goldstein (1992) scale, which we augmented to better apply to relations between firms and

7

Our reliance on the media to define the population of relevant stakeholders generates an inclusive set of
political, social and economic actors without regard to their normative legitimacy. As we seek to measure the
financial impact of stakeholder cooperation and conflict not the choice by managers as to whether to engage
with a specific stakeholder, we believe this strategy appropriate.
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stakeholders in the business context. Our scale measures company-stakeholder relations from
most cooperative (+10) to extremely conflictual (-10) using a vocabulary of over 5,000
unique verbs or verb phrases (see Appendix 1 for the summary categories; the full vocabulary
is available from the authors upon request). Table 1 provides several examples of sentences
from our database coded according to this protocol.
We aggregate these stakeholder events to reflect the level of a company‘s cooperation
or conflict with stakeholders at each mine in every quarter of available data, and compute a
rolling stock of stakeholder cooperation-conflict. The empirical measure is constructed using
a moving average that discounts the ―relevance‖ of past reports by weighing less a report
dating from the past than a current report. Formally, for each mine j of each company i at
time t we calculate:

 l n ji ,t l
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m 0
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cc ji ,t l , where

n ji ,t m

= level of stakeholder conflict-cooperation at mine j for company i at time t
= number of new media reports for mine j of company i at time t,
= window of the moving average, and
= discount factor.
The main results presented below are estimated using a window of eight quarters and a
discount rate of 0.8; sensitivity checks show that these results are robust to specifications
using alternative values. Summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables in our
dataset are reported in Table 2.
Policy Uncertainty. We measure the country-level policy uncertainty using the
Political Constraint Index (POLCON) dataset (Henisz, 2000a). The construction of this
measure begins with the identification of the number of independent branches of government
with veto power over policy change (e.g., one or two legislative chambers, the judiciary, and
sub-federal states or provinces). A measure of institutional constraints is then generated by
assuming that the preference of each branch and the status quo policy is drawn independently
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and identically from a uniform distribution. The measure is then modified to take into
account the extent of alignment across the branches of government and the extent of
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. The final values of the POLCON
index range from 0 (least constrained) – which corresponds to an executive with no formal
checks or balances on his behavior – to 0.89 – which corresponds to an executive checked by
a fractious bicameral legislature, the judiciary, and sub-federal provincial or state
governments (e.g., Belgium).
To the extent that such constraints serve to inhibit a host-country government from
reneging on prior commitments made to respect property rights (i.e., responding to the time
consistency problem they face in the case of long-term investment), countries with fewer
constraints have weak commitment mechanisms and, therefore, a more uncertain relationship
between resource valuation and financial market valuation or one that is more contingent
upon stakeholder engagement. Based on a similar logic to what we employ here, previous
studies have found that higher levels of POLCON are associated with a reduction in the
volatility of macroeconomic policies (Fatás & Mihov, 2003, Henisz, 2004) and the sensitivity
of trade policy to increases in unemployment (Henisz and Mansfield 2006).
Econometric models and results
Cooperative relationships between the firm and its various stakeholders indicate that
the company is likely to continue the development of the mining project without significant
planning or operational delays. We test whether the expected value of the company‘s mining
resources matches the market value, using random-parameter models which can
accommodate individual (i.e., parent firm level) heterogeneity in the relationship between
resource and financial market valuation, as well as random effects (or random intercept)
models and fixed effects models. A wide array of coefficient estimates obtained in companyby-company regressions (results not shown) indicate that investors assign different dollar
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values to a unit increase in the resource valuation (or the expected resource valuation) of
different mines. Random-parameter estimators can accommodate such unit to unit variation
by relaxing the assumption that the relationship between
true coefficients

and

and assuming instead that the coefficients

is defined by a vector of
are random variables.

We estimate the following random-parameter model:
∑
where

,

, and

.

Results vary considerably when estimating the regression coefficient on the resource
valuation for each company (

) and the expected resource valuation (

) that takes

into consideration stakeholder relations and policy uncertainty. The results obtained using the
random-parameter model are shown Table 3. The models assume that the coefficients are
random variables drawn from a normal distribution, and estimate both the mean and the
standard deviation for the intercept and the slope.
Model (1) shows that, when assuming that investors do not factor in the possibility of
delays in the planning stages and disruptions in the production stage, they are willing to pay,
on average, about 28 cents for an increase of 1 dollar in the resource valuation of a gold
mining company. By contrast, when we consider the possibility that in bringing the mine to
production the company will likely encounter various obstacles that delay the extraction of
the resources and model it in terms of the level of stakeholder cooperation or conflict (model
2), in terms of the level of political constraints (model 3), or in terms of both the level of
stakeholder cooperation/conflict and political constraints (models 4 and 5), the estimated
unconditional means for the coefficients are higher and closer to 1. More specifically, if we
adjust the resource valuation by the level of stakeholder cooperation/conflict as a proxy for
the likelihood of considerable delays or disruptions, our random estimate suggests that
investors are willing to pay, on average, about 52 cents for every dollar increase in the
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company‘s expected resource valuation. If we adjust the resource valuation by the level of
country-level political risk as a proxy for the likelihood of delays in the project development
schedule (model 3), the random coefficient estimates indicate that investors are willing to pay
about 46 cents for every dollar increase in the company‘s resource cash flows. Finally, if we
model the likelihood that the company will face delays and disruptions at its mine(s) in terms
of both the level of cooperation/conflict with stakeholder and country-level political risk
using the mean of the two (model 4) or their product (model 5), and we discount the valuation
of the company‘s resources by these values, the estimated random coefficient suggests that
investors are willing to pay, on average, between 63 and 86 cents for every dollar increase in
the expected resource valuation of a mining company.
We also estimate the equivalent of a random-intercept (or random effects) model in
which only the intercept is assumed to be a random variable,

, while the

coefficients on the independent variables are ―fixed‖ (i.e., non-random). The results presented
in Table 4 suggest that investors are willing to pay about 35 cents for an increase of 1 dollar
in the valuation of a company‘s gold mine project(s) if the possibility of delays and
disruptions is not accounted for; but they are willing to pay between 60 and 99 cents for an
increase of 1 dollar in the valuation of a company‘s gold mining project(s) if the likelihood of
moving ahead according to the announced schedule is defined in terms of the level of
stakeholder cooperation/conflict and the country-level political constraints. The results shown
are estimated using robust standard errors and are robust to specifications that control for
AR(1) processes. We obtain very similar results if estimating the parameters using fixed
effects and panel corrected standard errors (results not shown).
Robustness checks and sensitivity analysis
We checked the sensitivity of our results to considerations related to various
definitions of stakeholder relations and the measurement of this concept, the direction of
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causality, and concerns related to the mine development schedule considered in the analysis.
Overall, our results are robust to alternative measures and empirical specifications.
Stakeholder conflict/cooperation measure. Much of the work on the impact of
stakeholder engagement on corporate operations and performance is limited by data
availability to the analysis of stakeholders in the value chain. While our media-based event
data allows us to also incorporate various political actors (local, regional, national, and
foreign government officials and bureaucrats) and social stakeholders (community
representatives and various cultural, religious, ethnic, environmental and human rights
organizations), we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion/exclusion of
stakeholders in the company‘s value chain, such as private and state-owned businesses in the
mining industry and corporate and individual service providers. If we include in the analysis
only stakeholders in the value chain (but not other political and social actors) or exclude them
altogether, results are similar to the ones we presented above, which were estimated using all
the stakeholders identified by our media-based event data.
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to the choices we made while
constructing our measure of stakeholder cooperation/conflict. First, this measure represents a
moving average of event data that weighs less heavily stakeholder relations described in past
media reports relative to current information. The results shown were estimated using a
discount factor of 0.8 and we confirmed that our results are robust to a wide range of discount
factors, suggesting that our choice of a particular value does not affect the power of the
estimates. Second, we verified that our results are robust when model specifications include
measures of conflict/cooperation computed over different rolling windows. Specifically,
results do not change much if we use the contemporaneous level of stakeholder
cooperation/conflict or moving averages over two, four, or eight quarters. Finally, we
considered the possibility that similar levels of stakeholder cooperation/conflict can have
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different impacts in different countries depending on the overall environment in the country.
Our results do not change if we use a measure of stakeholder relations that is normalized by
the overall country-level stakeholder relations as generated by an automated (i.e., computerbased) coding using the same conflict and cooperation scale of all Reuters news stories in
which the subject and object of the headline are both identified as nationals of the host
country (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor, 2003, King & Lowe, 2003).
Direction of causality. First, to address concerns that our results are driven by
managerial agency or time variant firm-level heterogeneity, we regressed stakeholder
cooperation on lagged financial market valuation using the same set of specifications detailed
above. In no cases did we observe a statistically significant relationship. Second, we
confirmed that the resource valuation discounted using stakeholder cooperation/conflict and
political risk Granger causes the company market value and also verified that resource
valuation using future changes in the values of stakeholder cooperation/conflict (at times t+1
and t+2) do not predict market value. Third, we confirmed empirically that exogenous
increases in gold reserves (i.e., significant jumps in the net present value of a mine) do not
trigger adverse reactions from stakeholders, thus eliminating concerns that companies‘
discovery announcements rather than their interactions with stakeholders influence the level
of cooperation or conflict with stakeholders and indirectly market value.
Mine development schedules. By the end of our panel dataset, eleven mines in our
sample had reached production, while the remaining fifteen continued to be in either the
feasibility or construction stage, and therefore more vulnerable to future planning delays or
disruptions. Companies try to re-assure investors that production will begin in the near future
by announcing the planned production start date, but they sometimes have to revise these
announcements to reflect delays. We account for such real-life uncertainty by estimating the
resource value using both companies‘ announced production start date and a range of mine
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development schedules that accommodate different times for each of the exploration,
feasibility, construction, and production stages. The results we presented are estimated using
companies‘ announced production schedules; however, our results are robust to calculations
that assume very tight (or ―optimistic‖) development paths as well as more conservative (or
―slower‖) planned schedules.
We also checked that mine development schedules do not vary systematically across
the mines in our sample with either the level of stakeholder cooperation/conflict or the level
of political risk. We found that there is no evidence that companies are systematically
accelerating development and extraction schedules in environments with low stakeholder
cooperation or high political risk.
Discussion
Our theoretical arguments and empirical results point to the existence of a direct
positive and economically substantive relationship between financial market valuation and
stakeholder relations. Future research and analysis should continue to explore not only
tradeoffs but also complementarity between resource allocations to enhance stakeholder
cooperation and productive efficiency. This finding has important implications for future
research on corporate social responsibility, instrumental stakeholder theory and multinational
strategy which we discuss in turn. We also discuss the limitations of our analysis including,
in particular, questions regarding its generalizability beyond our sample of 19 publicly traded
gold mining companies. This discussion reveals exciting topics for future research.
The research on corporate social responsibility has struggled to make the business
case for such activity (Vogel, 2005). Initially supportive empirical results were rightly
attacked on the grounds of spurious or reverse causality and inappropriate metrics. Agency
theorists and financial economists countered with theoretical and empirical analysis that
highlighted how managers‘ pursuit of perquisites or individual morality diverted shareholder
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returns to stakeholder interests. Organizational economists extended these models to allow
for shareholder value maximizing redistributions to stakeholders in the direct economic value
chain under certain circumstances. Yet, in our empirical context, none of the mechanisms
emphasized by organizational economists are operative (i.e., consumers are unable to identify
the mine or company from which their purchase originates, miners and mining company
managers are not seen as leaders in social responsibility, investors who emphasize social
responsibility are seen as relatively peripheral and activists have limited power to cause direct
harm to investors).
We argue, by contrast, for a broader conceptualization of the potential financial
impact of stakeholders drawn from instrumental stakeholder theory. The value of certain
assets can be diminished if external stakeholders directly interfere with or lobby government
to interfere with the property rights of the owner of that asset. In our case, financial models
that generate a valuation for a gold mine omit the future uncertainty over government
regulation, permitting, and community relations, or take these factors to be exogenously or
environmentally determined. While it certainly simplifies financial models to make this
assumption, the actions of managers in the industry and analysts who both devote resources
and effort to mitigate and quantify what they call ―above-ground‖ risks suggest that they
disagree with this characterization and see variation in political and social support as a source
of competitive advantage or economic rents.
While managers, scholars of stakeholder relations and some activists have long
asserted the existence of a positive benefit from stakeholder engagement, empirical evidence
using corporate level data has been equivocal at best. The focus among theorists and
empirical scholars has turned to special circumstances where a link may yet exist. Our results
point to a need to broaden the scope of such inquiry. Where stakeholder cooperation is
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necessary to transform an asset into shareholder returns, a direct link between productive
efficiency and stakeholder cooperation exists.
This link offers an opportunity for instrumental stakeholder theory to address the
question of which stakeholders are more important and how much should managers invest in
their relationships. Current empirical efforts to examine corporate-level reporting and
practices are too far removed from the operational practices of greatest concern to
stakeholders both external and internal to the corporation. By tracking the actions and
statements of media-relevant stakeholders, scholars and practitioners can avoid subjective
biases, broaden the potential pool of covered firms and better identify which practices at
which times substantively contribute to market valuation. In ongoing research, rather than
simply capturing a moving average of stakeholder cooperation and conflict, we construct
stakeholder networks for each of the 26 mines. Using the same coding protocol we deployed
here, we capture every stakeholder event in which the mine OR another stakeholder is the
object of the sentence. The resulting dataset is amenable to analysis using tools developed in
the network literature to ascertain the relative importance of various stakeholders in the
diffusion of cooperation or conflict as well as the optimal strategies for an organization
seeking to enhance its degree of stakeholder cooperation (Nartey, 2010, Nebus & Rufin,
2010, Rowley, 1997, Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). While currently time intensive, progress
in information extraction software development (King & Lowe, 2003) could allow for lowercost deployment in the near future.
Such progress is particularly needed in the study of multinational firms who, by virtue
of their foreignness, are more likely to engender a conflictual relationship with a given host
country stakeholder than a cooperative one (Zaheer, 1995). Such reactions may be based on
intrinsic nationalism or opportunistically formented (i.e., by a domestic opponent or other
stakeholder who seeks to supplant or stop project development). Whereas the political risk
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literature in international business has made great strides in modeling the formal institutional
structures that govern the likelihood of policy change in response to such pressure (Henisz,
2000b), the extent to which investors from one country may be more or less susceptible to
this pressure (Holburn & Zelner, 2010) and the existence of experiential learning in the
mitigation of these pressures (Delios & Henisz, 2002a, 2002b, Henisz & Delios, 2004, 2002,
2001), the tactics or mechanisms that firms actually deploy in such cases remain largely
unexamined despite long-standing exhortations for analysis (Behrman, Boddewyn, &
Kapoor, 1975, Boddewyn & Cracco, 1972, Kobrin, 1979) as does the use of project-level
data rather than firm-level proxies (Kobrin, 1979). The dynamic and contingent analysis of
stakeholder networks could usefully extend the existing literature examining the impact of
political risk on multinational strategy bringing it closer to scholarship in non-market strategy
(Baron, 1995a, 1995b, Baron, 2009, Baron & Diermeier, 2007, Hillman & Hitt, 1999) as well
as strategic corporate social responsibility (Kytle & Ruggie, 2005, Porter & Kramer, 2011,
Porter & Kramer, 2006b, Post, Preston, & Sauter-Sachs, 2002)
We believe that the scope of such potential inquiry is far wider than the gold mining
industry. While we chose this empirical context because it allowed us to clearly identify the
existence of the mechanism we posited between stakeholder cooperation and market
valuation in isolation from numerous potential competing causal explanations, the contingent
nature of property rights faced by owners of gold mines has widespread analogues in other
industrial contexts. The argument clearly applies to other natural resources (e.g., minerals, oil
or gas, agriculture and water). Industries with substantial upfront investments and long
payback periods are similarly influenced by the realization of property rights over those upfront investments in property, plant and equipment, intellectual property, production
processes or brand. Concerns over government and stakeholder support for the right to
transform property are heightened where the good or service manufactured or the production
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process is politically or socially salient. Such salience is a function of perceptions of
spillovers both negative (e.g., environmental or social costs, disruptions of cultural tradition
and heritage, and the reinforcement of preexisting inequity) and positive (e.g., categorization
as high technology or desirability, creation of high value added jobs, consistency with
broader social or political objectives, or a critical and undersupplied input into a production
process that itself has these characteristics). While the absolute and relative importance of
this direct link between perceptions of social responsibility and market valuation will
obviously vary enormously across industries and countries, we would argue from the above
set of conditions that its existence is ubiquitous. In short, the social license to operate is more
than rhetoric. It is operationalizable, empirically testable and strategically relevant. For these
mining firms, pursuing cooperation from and minimizing conflict with stakeholders is not
just corporate social responsibility but enlightened self-interest.
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Table 1: Samples of Stakeholder Event Coding
Sentence Text

Source (i.e.,
subject)

Verb(s)

Target(s) (i.e.,
object(s))

ASG Chairman Stephen Everett also praised RAMSI and local police and
thanked the Solomons government for its positive support

ASG
Chairman
Stephen
Everett
President
Nazarbayev

Praise;
Thank

Local Police;
Solomons
Government

Ceremonially
kicked off

Salamis President of
Rusoro

build
connections

Varvarinskoye
deposit [owned
by European
Minerals
Corporation]
Venezuelan
government

Mr. Kabila
[leader of
ADFL rebel
group]

ordered… to
negotiate or
see their
concessions
sold
fight for
survival

On September 14th 2007, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan
ceremonially kicked off the process of extracting gold and copper ore at the
Varvarinskoye deposit. He was quoted as saying that this mine is one of
many enterprises in the region that will ―build up the power of
Kazakhstan‘s economy
[George] Salamis [President of Rusoro, Russian firm] shied away from
commenting directly on the importance of Rusoro's Russian component but
instead said: "We wouldn't be anywhere in Venezuela if it weren't for the
great connections we've built with the Venezuelan government at all levels.
Mr. Kabila has ordered foreign companies operating there to negotiate or
see their concessions sold to rivals. The companies involved - the Torontobased exploration company Banro Resource, a Belgian-Canadian
consortium called Mindev and Barrick Gold, one of the world's largest gold
companies - are in an unenviable position.
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as rebels backed by
neighboring Rwanda and Uganda have pushed their way westward toward
the capital city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are supporting Kabila
with arms and troops.
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as rebels backed by
neighboring Rwanda and Uganda have pushed their way westward toward
the capital city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are supporting Kabila
with arms and troops.
Kabila's government is fighting for its survival as rebels backed by
neighboring Rwanda and Uganda have pushed their way westward toward
the capital city of Kinshasa. Zimbabwe and Angola are supporting Kabila
with arms and troops.

Kabila‘s
government

Rwanda
back
government;
Uganda
government
Zimbabwe
Support with
government; arms
Angola
government
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Foreign
companies
Banro, Mindev
& Barrick
rebels

Rebels

Kabila

ConflictCooperatio
n Category
[express
support
verbally]

ConflictCooperation
Scale
3

[show
support
through
action]

4

[build
positive
relations
with]
[Threaten]

3

[opposed
in active
military
conflict]
[support in
active
military
conflict]
[support in
active
military
conflict]

-10

-4

10

10

Table 2. Summary statistics and Correlation Matrix

Min

Max

3.930
83.819
0.000

2279.556
2294.293
799.493

73
115
176

125.524
0.507
0.158

79.642
0.218
0.198

9.790
0.000
0.000

339.052
1.000
0.670

0.110
0.121

0.911

0.206
0.082
0.155

0.913
-0.116
-0.085

Table 3. Random coefficient estimates
38

Conflict/Coop

355.215
522.003
166.453

Valuation *
(Conflict/Coop +
Political Constraints)/2)

304.227
594.553
221.013

Resource Valuation

Market Value
Resource Valuation
Valuation * Conflict/Coop
Valuation * (Conflict/Coop + Political
Constraints)/2
Conflict/Cooperation
Political Constraints

Std. Dev.

176
147
112

Market Value

Market Value
Resource Valuation
Valuation * Conflict/Cooperation
Valuation * ((Conflict/Cooperation + Political
Constraints)/2)
Conflict/Cooperation
Political Constraints

Mean

0.905
0.260
-0.241

0.092
0.152

-0.203

Political Constraints

Observations

Valuation*
Conflict/Coop

Variable

Resource valuation of company

(1)
0.284*
(2.55)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.523*
(2.41)

Resource Value * Cooperation/Conflict

0.464*
(2.21)

Resource Value * Political Constraints

Resource Value * (Cooperation/Conflict +
Political Constraints)/2

0.631***
(4.02)

Resource Value * Cooperation/Conflict *
Political Constraints

0.867*
(2.52)

Constant
lns1_1_1
Constant
lns1_1_2
Constant
atr1_1_1_2
Constant
lnsig_e
Constant
Observations

183.5***
(4.32)

177.7***
(3.60)

208.8***
(5.30)

176.7***
(4.41)

195.7***
(4.99)

-0.982***
(-4.13)

-0.308
(-1.17)

-0.615
(-1.60)

-1.026*
(-2.06)

-0.126
(-0.33)

5.070***
(23.95)

5.205***
(23.83)

4.731***
(12.56)

4.720***
(9.81)

4.706***
(12.01)

-0.337
(-1.05)

-0.487
(-1.55)

-0.121
(-0.27)

0.155
(0.29)

-0.231
(-0.49)

4.946***
(111.93)
289

4.860***
(97.21)
235

4.816***
(73.20)
141

4.810***
(73.40)
141

4.825***
(71.17)
136

t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4. Random effects estimates with robust standard errors
(1)
Resource valuation of company

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.355*
(2.43)
0.221***
(5.90)

Resource Value * Cooperation/Conflict

0.495***
(3.50)

Resource Value * Political Constraints

Resource Value * (Cooperation/Conflict +
Political Constraints)/2

0.594***
(4.50)

Resource Value * Cooperation/Conflict *
Political Constraints

0.988***
(4.21)

Constant
Observations

168.1**
(3.06)
289

231.2***
(4.81)
235

t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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223.5***
(3.99)
141

188.4***
(3.33)
141

208.1***
(4.02)
136

